Follow-on appendices contain detailed information and analysis of use to doctrine, force structure, and materiel planners. For example, using the combat power formula delineated by FM , Operations ,:. Counterintelligence 1. Identify adversary information collection and processing capabilities and vulnerabilities.
Understand how the adversary processes and disseminates information and intelligence to support their decision making process. Conduct collection efforts targeting adversary intelligence activities. Plan and execute operations to exploit adversary intelligence activities and support C2 attack.
Conduct investigations to prove, disprove, and neutralize indications of espionage, subversion, and other national security crimes by adversary intelligence activities; and support C2 protect. Perform analysis to provide the commander with timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence regarding adversary intelligence activities and predict adversary intelligence actions and reactions.
Human Intelligence 1. Collect and report information obtained from human sources and foreign media. Provide information on adversary plans, capabilities and intentions. Interrogate prisoners of war and civilian detainees.
Conduct human reconnaissance and surveillance. Participate in the intelligence mission analysis and planning process. The Problem. The strategic counterintelligence force is constantly and fully engaged. We need a strategic force agile enough to shift from peacetime strategic activities to focus on operational and tactical requirements in a time of crisis or conflict. We need a force with immediate access to the requirements, equipped with the automation tools necessary for conducting rapid analysis, dynamic cross-cueing, and immediate reporting.
Operations in Peace. In the future, the strategic force must achieve a level of agility and capability that allows satisfaction of requirements levied by senior decision makers, laws enacted by Congress and directives in policy documents yet shift from peacetime activities to focus on operational and tactical requirements in a time of crisis or conflict.
These forces work closely with their operational counterparts to establish complementary training goals, adversary data bases, database maintenance responsibilities, and investigations, as required. Operations in Conflict. Connectivity with warfighting commanders will be continuous and dynamic--from planning and deployment, through force build-up, decisive operations, and redeployment. In most instances, Army Strategic CI will support the warfighting commander with specific resources and by internally adjusting its priority of effort.
However, regulatory and policy requirements will not disappear with the deployment of combat forces. Counterespionage activities, support to sustaining base organizations, and satisfaction of requirements not related to the current crisis will continue. Requirements Delineation. We detail specific requirements for each echelon in Appendix 3. Identification of tasks, conditions, and standards common to each echelon and the incorporation of task training at institutional, unit, and individual levels.
Near-real-time voice, data, and video communications between echelons and the supported commander. Standard message and reporting formats interoperable from national to tactical IAW common operating environment standards. Standard mission, requirements, and asset management protocols between echelons. This section highlights what we believe to be the most significant adjustments. We provide a more detailed impact analysis at Appendix 4. Leadership Development. In the future, Commanders must insist that their senior intelligence officer is knowledgeable of such operations.
Commanders and intelligence leaders need to understand these agencies in order to leverage their capabilities and limitations consistent with battlespace requirements and commander intent.
The Commander Drives Intelligence--he alone calculates risks and synchronizes operations in his battlespace. Ultimately, it is the influence of the intelligence officer on the commander that assures proper utilization of resources.
We also recommend the creation of a certification program that begins as a Novice with graduation from IET that transitions to Journeyman as a senior E-6 or acceptance as a Warrant Officer and becomes a Master Operator as an E8 or senior CW3. Individuals will receive the certification only after completion of specific training and assignments. To assure such assignment, we recommend the creation of a 35E certification program that designates training and experience criteria for each command position.
Protect the Force. They will take advantage of Army strategic CI capabilities through connectivity or resource tailored support packages pushed down to the operational and tactical levels.
Automated processing and analysis capabilities will provide graphical displays that show relationships and linkages between events, personalities, and factions. This will include information sharing, source deconfliction and integrated operations as situations dictate. This will require close coordination in planning and executing operations such as screening at traffic control points, handling enemy prisoners of war EPW and displaced civilians, performing cordon and search operations, conducting threat and vulnerability assessments, implementing population control measures, and tracking threat personalities, to name a few.
This will require like communications and automation capabilities, source and information data bases, analytical methods, and common access to a set of files and information. Project the Force. They will provide deploying combat forces direct and immediate contact with US Country Teams, DHS, and host nation intelligence and security services.
Sustaining base CI assets will support the movement of forces and equipment through ports of embarkation, and provide national level CI analysis, as well as current data base holdings, geared to the target area and threat. The end-state vision will require split-based and push-pull broadcast intelligence capabilities, including the ability to receive updates enroute. Deployed teams will require automated language translation systems for interrogations, document exploitation and source operations.
They will also require linguists organic to the teams to accomplish their collection mission. These elements have special considerations in this operational pattern because of their special ingress and egress needs.
Sustain the Force. This may require a mix and series of additional collection teams, operational management teams, and teams in Analysis and Control Elements ACE working with intelligence officers, operations staffs, collection managers, technical support teams, and military intelligence units. Gain Information Dominance. By providing insights into adversary intentions, senior decision makers and commanders can plan and execute friendly operations accordingly.
This will require capabilities at all echelons and substantial shared databases. In support of friendly OPSEC initiatives, analysis will show how the enemy sees the friendly picture.
Shape the Battlespace. Reporting from interrogations and source debriefings will be essential as the commander gains an understanding of the adversary and the battlespace. Long range surveillance units will augment, complement and trigger other collection systems that are more vulnerable to limitations such as weather, range, terrain masking, and enemy countermeasures.
LRS units also allow commanders to gather timely information that does not need lengthy processing and analysis. Interrogators will give a unique vision of the adversary, face-to-face. CI capabilities in sanctuary will provide another set of tools to commanders as they set battlefield conditions and shape the battlespace. OFCO provides the commander a capability to directly interact with adversary intelligence elements. Decisive Operations. CI will provide opportunities to neutralize adversary collection at critical junctures.
These operations are thus complementary to not duplicative of those of DHS. The focus of these operations is on Army specific requirements satisfying the tactical and operational needs of Army commanders. In all cases, however, the Army will coordinate these operations to ensure the effective application of resources against Army requirements without duplication of effort. Strategic CI will provide key support to both sustaining base and deployed forces, and will be crucial to meeting force protection, information operations, and technology protection missions.
It supports. Projects tailored CI teams with technical, collection, investigative, operations and analysis capabilities to reinforce and support operational level and deployed commanders. Also provides resources to the Military Operational Training Course. Of particular interest is ensuring complementary programs of instruction; equitable burden sharing; and applicability to soldiers ECB. Assess foreign capabilities to acquire key technologies in their military force modernization programs and systems.
Assess foreign governmental and societal stability with a view towards identifying and predicting emerging terrorist threats. Develop databases outlining the Information Warfare capabilities of specified countries. Define select characteristics and performance data on foreign armor, anti-armor, air defense, IEW, missile, engineer and mine warfare, aircraft, and soldier systems.
Acquire and exploit foreign systems with military applications to determine potential threats to US forces and systems. Acquire and create a database of signatures on all foreign C4I and weapons systems.
ID and locate belligerent personalities under suspicion of or wanted for crimes under the provisions of international law. HUMINT specific: ID, collect, and process biographic data on key foreign figures, both civilians and military, having an impact on tactical, operational and strategic decisions.
Force Protection CI specific: ID and assess the capabilities, intentions, and operations of foreign intelligence and security services to acquire essential information on forces, operations, C2 and C4I capabilities, and on research and development program information and technologies embedded in current and future Army systems. ID and assess capabilities and intentions of terrorist groups who pose a potential threat to US Army personnel, facilities, or operations.
Detect, locate, identify, process, track, report, counteract, and exploit all-source intelligence collection threats against friendly forces, research and development and acquisition activities, critical technologies, C4I systems and networks, and personnel. ID critical friendly facilities, forces, information nodes and vulnerabilities.
ID threat paramilitary forces. Determine countermeasures required to deny a given threat information on friendly intentions, plans and operations. Update biographic data on key foreign intelligence, military, security and law enforcement figures, both military and civilian. Detect and report foreign intelligence activities directed against friendly forces, operations, installations, materiel and Army personnel.
Detect, identify, locate, and report the location, strength, and capabilities of threat ground forces. Identify and report activities related to the acquisition of new military capabilities. Battlefield Damage Assessment CI specific: ID and report from the CI perspective damage to information, technologies, forces, C4I systems, materiel, and personnel caused by FISS, terrorism, and deliberate security compromise activities, for situational development, friendly reconstitution and sustainment, and for CI target development and retargeting requirements.
Strategic CI will perform the following functions to accomplish its Army-wide mission. This will be a major undertaking at this level in order to support CI analytical efforts Army-wide, and provide a split-based push and pull capability for CI information and databases to deployed forces.
They will accomplish this task with a strategic all-source fusion center for dedicated CI and counterterrorism analysis and production for the Army. Red Team Simulations attempt to replicate foreign intelligence methods for penetrations and collections of a specified target. This function will require a coordinated effort between signals, communications, automation, physical security, and criminal investigation specialists.
This includes the use of sophisticated special investigative techniques. This will continue to be a strategic CI function due to the nature and scope of these operations. Although located at the strategic level for control and management, strategic CI must ensure the capability to support operational and tactical operations.
This will include CI scope polygraph examinations as well as support to CI operations. We will use it anytime a source provides time-sensitive information which may have a direct impact on the safety of US forces and the information is not otherwise verifiable.
Although the Army will control this function at the strategic level, we will be able to push this capability down to the lowest level through the force projection brigade into multiple theaters of operation.
They will establish links to host nation and regional agencies for liaison and information gathering in contingency areas; and conduct collection efforts external to, but focused on, the target area. By maintaining a continuous forward deployed presence and collection emphasis, their operations will be critical in answering many pre-deployment and pre-hostility requirements across all echelons. A pre-deployment presence will give them a force reception capability.
As such, they become key elements for protecting the force through the entire force projection pattern. In fact, during an SASO, it is likely that tactical commands will require operational level assets from the onset.
This is especially true when we consider the likelihood that the Army Component will be an ECB organization under a major Army or joint command. Conversely, we may pull operational assets to support strategic level efforts. Army strategic CI will push capabilities and packages into the area operations through the Force Projection Brigade.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Develop ground, paramilitary and other selected orders of battle on regional threat forces. Describe transportation and movement networks, egress and ingress routes in JTF battlespace. Describe threat doctrine, concepts, and targeting philosophies and their impact on friendly operations. ID significant political, social and cultural factors in belligerent countries that impact on friendly operations. Describe doctrine, concepts, and targeting philosophies of belligerent countries and their impact on friendly operations.
Force Protection Detect, identify, locate, track, and report threat elements to friendly forces within JTF battlespace and probable threat intentions. Identify and report on threat paramilitary forces. ID critical friendly facilities, forces, information nodes, and vulnerabilities. Define the intelligence threat to the friendly force mission external to the JTF battlespace. Determine countermeasures required to deny the threat information on friendly intentions, plans, and operations.
Evaluate the success of friendly C2W operations. Detect, identify and report internal security threats to friendly forces in the host country. Detect, locate, identify, and counter terrorism. Detect, locate, identify, and track threat SOF elements. Update biographic data on key foreign figures, both civilian and military. ID and report opportunities for friendly C2W operations. Detect and report foreign intelligence activities directed against friendly operations, forces, installations, and materiel.
Report and track status of friendly prisoners of war and personnel missing in action. Detect, locate, identify and report new obstacles in JTF battlespace. Differentiate between decoys and actual high priority targets. ID potential non-lethal targets economic centers of gravity, cultural population centers, etc.
Battlefield Damage Assessment ID and report damage inflicted on the threat to include estimated casualties to evaluate threat operational status for situation and target development and retargeting requirements. ID and report damage to threat reconstitution and sustainment efforts including major ports, airfields, and logistics facilities. Determine and report damage to transportation networks, main lines of communication, telecommunications, information networks and processes, and logistics facilities within the JTF battlespace.
The Force Projection Brigade, the operational level military intelligence unit, will provide a forward presence during pre-hostilities and, as such, will play a crucial role during preparing, projecting, protecting, and sustaining the force. Corps, division, and tactical brigade missions and requirements will be similar and overlapping.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ID composition, disposition, strength, tactics, capabilities, C4I and training status of threat. ID threat perception of the friendly mission. ID population demographics, location of noncombatant populations, social, cultural and economic issues, and areas of expected refugee flow.
ID the perception of friendly operations by all governments, belligerent organizations, host country populaces and refugees.
ID and assess all potential actions of belligerents that violate agreements, protocols, or laws. Force Protection Provide information on threat RISTA, subversive, sabotage and terrorist efforts while friendly units are in sanctuary, enroute, or in assembly areas to protect friendly information, personnel, equipment and operations.
Conduct host country liaison. Situation Development ID violations of agreements by belligerent forces. ID and monitor changes to the political, economic and social environment that could have a major impact on friendly operations. Detect, ID, and locate threat SOF activities and agents, paramilitary sites and forces, and terrorist groups and their support structures.
Target Development and Support to Targeting ID and locate enemy conventional and unconventional organizations and their leaders; critical LOCs, airfields, ports and logistics bases to target accuracy requirements for lethal or non-lethal attack.
Battlefield Damage Assessment Collect and report damage to targets engaged by lethal and non-lethal means to include effects upon conventional and unconventional organizations, intelligence and decisionmaking processes, RISTA capabilities, weapons systems, and threat personnel.
Functions identified in subparagraphs 1 thru 16 below are common to the tactical and operational levels. They are similar by design to achieve standardization and commonality for a truly seamless architecture.
The primary difference is operational level products will reflect the different focus and needs of the operational level commander, and this is the first level where we satisfy Departmental TITLE X and Joint requirements.
Functions identified in subparagraphs 17 thru 21 below are found only at the operational level. It applies in peacetime, transition to conflict, conflict, and transition back to peace. NOTE: In some special situations, these measures are taken to make the operation less visible to the casual observer. Also, in some cultures, sharing food and beverages among friends is expected; exceptions to restrictions or general orders should be considered to facilitate successful HUMINT team operations, many of which are geared towards developing relationships with potential sources of information.
Commanders may restrict personnel to base camps and installations during the initial stages of operations PME to MTW , when the operational environment is being assessed, or as a temporary expedient when the threat level exceeds the ability to provide reasonable FP. Operational restrictions minimize the risk to the HUMINT team, but minimizing its collection potential may increase the risk to the force as a whole. While confined to an installation or a base camp, the HUMINT team can maintain a limited level of information collection by:.
As the degree of contact with the population increases, both the quantity and quality of collection increases. In many instances, however, there is a risk to the team inherent with increased exposure to the local population. The risk to HUMINT assets must be balanced with the need to collect priority information and to protect the force as a whole. They plan and rehearse to readily react to any situation and carry the necessary firepower to disengage from difficult situations.
If it becomes necessary to call for assistance, adequate and redundant communications equipment is critical. These scenarios and actions should be trained prior to deployment into a contingency area and rehearsed continuously throughout the deployment. The supported commander must weigh the risk versus potential information gain when establishing operational parameters of supporting HUMINT teams.
When it is not expedient to deploy the HUMINT team independently due to threat levels or other restrictions, the team can be integrated into other ongoing operations. This method reduces the risk to the team while allowing a limited ability to collect information. It has the advantage of placing the team in contact with the local population and allowing it to spot, assess, and interact with potential sources of information.
However, this deployment method restricts collection by subordinating the team's efforts to the requirements, locations, and timetables of the unit or operation into which it is integrated and does not allow for the conduct of sensitive source operations. This method of employment should be considered a last resort. Basic C2, transportation, and weapons requirements do not differ significantly from most soldier requirements and are available as unit issue items.
This can be in the form of either landlines or cellular telephones. Communications systems must be equipped with an open-ended architecture to allow for expansion and compatibility with other service elements, government organizations, NGOs, and multinational elements to effectively communicate during CONOPS.
HUMINT teams must be able to transmit while geographically separated from their parent unit while operating remotely. With time, effective collection planning and management at all echelons, the HUMINT team can collect a wealth of information. The sorting and analysis of this information in a timely and efficient manner is crucial to operations. Automation helps the HUMINT team to report, database, analyze, and evaluate the collected information quickly and to provide the supported unit with accurate data in the form of timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence.
Automation hardware and software must be user friendly as well as interoperable among different echelons and services. They must interface with the communications equipment of the HUMINT team as well as facilitate the interface of audiovisual devices. Technical support for hardware and software must be available and responsive. Biometric physiological, neurological, thermal analysis, facial and fingerprint recognition technologies will allow rapid identification; coding and tracking of adversaries and human sources; and cataloging of information concerning enemy prisoners of war EPWs , detainees, and civilians of HUMINT interest on the battlefield.
Biometrics will also provide secure authentication of individuals seeking network or facility access. HUMINT teams work with multinational forces, and other foreign nationals, and require the ability to communicate in their respective languages. HUMINT teams require textual and voice translation devices, source verification, and deception detection machines biometrics to improve collection capability and accuracy.
HUMINT teams require dynamic machine language translation MLT tools that provide both non-linguists and those with limited linguist skills a comprehensive, accurate means to conduct initial screenings and basic interviews in a variety of situations.
HUMINT elements will focus on in-depth interviews and communications with persons of higher priority. MLT tools will minimize reliance on contract linguists and will allow soldiers to concentrate on mission accomplishment. The HUMINT team also may operate in urban and rural areas, where the threat level can vary from semi-hostile to hostile.
The safety of the HUMINT team can be enhanced with equipment that can detect, locate, suppress, illuminate, and designate hostile optical and E-O devices. In addition, high power, gyro-stabilized binoculars, which can be used from a moving vehicle, also increase the survivability of the HUMINT team. It also gives the team another surveillance and collection device. The teams can use the following equipment in their open-source collection efforts.
In some cases HUMINT teams require a stand-off, high resolution optical surveillance and recording capability that can provide target identification at extended ranges to protect the intelligence collector while avoiding detection by the adversary target.
An advanced optical capability provides intelligence collectors the ability to locate and track adversarial targets passive and hostile for identification, collection, and target exploitations. Security clearances and contractual agreements will help the team determine the level of integration.
Along with the basic briefing of what is expected of the civilian linguists as interpreters, HUMINT teams should be informed about the civilians' chain of command and the scope of their duties beyond interpreting. A good battle hand-off is critical to smooth transition and mission success. The battle hand-off can directly contribute to mission success or failure of the outgoing team, but especially of the incoming team.
Regardless of how long the team believes it will operate within the AO, it must ensure there is a seamless transition to an incoming team, other US unit, or agency. The HUMINT team accomplishes this transition by establishing procedures for source administration, database maintenance, and report files. Teams must plan and implement a logical and systematic sequence of tasks to enable an incoming team to assume the operations in the AO.
Adequate time must be allotted for an effective battle hand-off. In some environments, a few weeks may be necessary to accomplish an effective battle hand-off. Introductions to sources of information, especially HUMINT contact operations sources, are critical and teams must prioritize their time.
Area orientation is critical. These include major routes, population centers, potential hot spots, and other points of interest such as police stations, political centers, and social centers. In all cases, commanders at each echelon will exercise command over the forces assigned to their organization. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using resources, planning for and employment of forces, and ensuring that forces accomplish assigned missions.
Leaders and staffs exercise control to facilitate mission accomplishment. It determines gaps in reporting and coordinates with other analysis teams and technical controllers to cross-cue other collection sensor systems.
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